Manufacturing: the new case for vertical integration by Kumpe, Ted & Bolwijn, Piet T.
The solid corporation acquires suppliers
along with technology.
Manufacturing:
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Ever since Robert Hayes and the late William
Abernathy exposed the ways we manage our eompa-
nies into decline, executives in big manufacturing
corporations have been struggling with a central stra-
tegic problem.' It is to find the right balance between
investing in vertical integration and encouraging
process technology development among suppliers.
The problem for managers is "not their reluctance
to take action and make investments," Hayes and
Abernathy observed, "but that, when they do so, their
action bas the unintended result of reinforcing the
status quo. In deciding to integrate backward because
of apparent short-term rewards, managers often re-
strict tbeir ability to strike out in innovative direc-
tions in the future."
3y "innovative directions," Hayes andAbemathy meant strategic approacbes that ab-sorb into the production chain the most tech-nologically advanced and cost-effective ways
of making components. For any manufacturer, tbey
conceded, backward integration eliminates some
purchasing and marketing functions, centralizes
overhead, and allows the pooling of RfidD and design
efforts; where components are, in effect, commodi-
1, Robert H. Hayes and William). Abernathy, "Managing Our Way to Eco-
nomic Decline," HBR Iiily-August 1980, p. 67,
ties (ferrous metals or petroleum, for example), back-
ward integration almost certainly boosts profits.
Nevertheless, for a technologically active company-
one that makes sophisticated consumer electronics
or durables-they saw a serious risk. Indeed, Hayes
and Abernathy suggested that such a company's best
course would be to bid for individual components,
not for otber businesses.
"[Managers] may suddenly discover that tbeir
decision to make rather than buy important parts
has locked their companies into an outdated tech-
nology." They may find themselves "shut off from
the R&.D efforts of various independent suppliers
by becoming their competitor." Moreover, when a
company commits its time and resources to master
technology back up the channel of supply, it may be
distracted from doing its job well. "Long-term con-
tracts and long-term relationships with suppliers can
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"Nice to meet you, Benson. Any friend of free
market forces is a friend of mine."
achieve many of the same cost henefits as hackwaid
integration without calhng into question a compa-
ny's ahility to innovate or respond to innovation."
The further development of computer-driven
manufacturing systems during the years since Hayes
and Abernathy issued their warning has certainly
vindicated a part of their argument-the part that
emphasizes the revolutionary henefits of technology.
We know a good deal ahout what it takes to absorb
advanced manufacturing systems into the plant-
more precisely, how they transform the plant; we
know how expensive and taxing automation can he.
General Electric has heen working for five years to
transform its Appliance Park complex in Louisville,
Kentucky (where it builds dishwashers, washers and
dryers, refrigerators, and electric ranges) into a highly
automated operation. Islands of automation intro-
duced at the dishwasher facility in 1983 have slashed
cycle times from five days to several hours, and have
helped GE boost market share from 30% to more
than 40%. The new refrigerator line, on which $100
million was spent, is automated from one end of the
plant to the other. All told, output at Appliance Park
has increased while employment has declined from
19,000 to 10,000 over the past decade. GE managers
hardly needed the distractions of running compo-
nents husinesses not already their own during this
high-stakes transition.
At the same time, Hayes and Ahernathy have heen
proved right about the devolution of important de-
sign and R&D functions onto upstream producers.
Many smaller suppliers, especially parts makers in
the auto industry, have gained skill in computer-
aided design and manufacturing systems. Many
manufacturers of finished goods have come to de-
pend on innovative suppliers and machine tool ven-
dors to develop robust parts and more efficient
manfacturing systems-tasks they used to perform
on their own. On the other hand, a good many inde-
pendent suppliers should now he considered mem-
bers of the hig corporation's family-not owned, hut
so beholden to the big corporation that their husi-
ness plans are controlled from above. Is the age of
vertical integration over?
We think not. In our view, the solid corporation
will continue to view vertical integration as a critical
part of manufacturing reform. No douht, major man-
ufacturers have to leam to get the most from suppli-
ers. But manufacturing reform and backward
integration are related in subtle ways to the three
stages of production over which the big manufactur-
ers preside. Without integration, technology-based
corporations may wind up beggaring upstream com-
ponents producers-businesses that need the most
investment-in order to earn premiums for down-
stream assembly and distribution operations, busi-
nesses that are comparatively flush. This cannot go
on indefinitely.
Three Tiers of Production
The advantages of hackward integration hecome
clearer when we look closely at the levels of produc-
tion and at the market forces and advanced technolo-
gies shaping each one.
Generally speaking, the production process can he
divided into three stages: the assembly stage, the suh-
assemhly stage, and the component stage; at each
there is a separate tier of factories and husinesses.
Phihps' compact disc players, for example, are pro-
duced in plants designed to make finished players
from subassemblies, typically, a deck-the chassis
into which the motor, laser, and other parts have heen
integrated-a printed circuit board, and so on. More
familiar, perhaps, are subassemblies for cars: engines,
gearboxes, or brakes.
In most cases, suhassemblies are produced at some
distance from assembly plants, either hy indepen-
dent companies-that is, original equipment manu-
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facturer (OEM) suppliers-or by wholly (or partially)
owned subsidiaries. Philips owns 400 factories, sev-
eral of which produce subassemblies such as picture
tubes, motors for VCRs or CD players, and decks for
VCRs-not only for Philips but also for some of its
competitors. The picture tube factories, for instance,
deliver roughly 50% of their turnover to non-Philips
customers.
At the base of the production pyramid are the com-
ponents makers; the component stage is to subas-
sembly what subassembly is to assembly. The
components of a compact disc player-molded plas-
tics, chips, resistors, and wires-may come from in-
dependent or subsidiary businesses, large or small. A
car's components are the balance shafts or pistons
incorporated into the engine, or the stamped sheet-
metal parts that are welded into unpainted "white-
bodies." Philips' component factories produce resis-
tors, capacitors, metalware, semiconductors, plastic
parts, and other items. These units also act as suppli-
ers for customers both inside and outside the
company.
Advanced manufacturing systems affect eachtier of production in a different way so that,at each, the cost of failing to invest in pro-cess technology is quite different. Each tier
competes to serve a distinct market. Each tier will
have speeial problems with respect to production
flexibility and quality control.
Consider, first, the changing strategic and manu-
facturing priorities of assemblers, the big industrial
corporations themselves. During the 1950s, in a
world economy characterized by scarcity, price was
the most important criterion for any consumer. Peo-
ple were happy to have a radio or ear; manufacturers
were happy to mass-produce hard goods, most of
which now seem terribly primitive, in huge batches
along moving assembly lines-and with the cheapest
labor possible. During the 1970s, following the sharp
rise in prosperity, quality became as important for
consumers as price. Increasingly, consumers are de-
manding quality products more nearly tailored to
individual needs and tastes-products for young pro-
fessionals, families, and retirees.
And so corporations like Philips need to be particu-
larly good at manufacturing flexibility, the produc-
tion of customized products aimed at market niches.
To compete effectively in world markets we must
differentiate our product lines from the start, with-
out sacrificing quality or price. In the middle of the
game we must be flexible enough to increase volume
sharply for segments in which demand proves high.
Finally, we must redesign our products relentlessly,
so they do not outstay their welcome.
Just look at audio/video products, whose commer-
cial life cycles have dropped to a year, in some cases
even less. Philips produced about 100 different color
television models in 1972. At present, its product line
worldwide includes more than 500 different models.
As for CD players. Philips puts a new generation on
the market almost every year, and each generation of-
fers a jump forward in styling and technology Philips
produced 10 types of players in 1982, 150 today.
Manufacturing corporations that do not work to
shorten product life cycles in this way will almost
certainly be leapfrogged by the competition.
How Assemblers Do Well
And so new marketing pressures and technological
advances are causing Philips to rethink its invest-
ment priorities. What kind of manufacturing strategy
is right for assemblers? In the short run, it is probably
not a good idea to invest heavily in advanced flexible
manufacturingsystems-not yet. Managers still can-
not buy robots that are both flexible and inexpensive
enough to handle major design changes in end prod-
ucts, whose life cycles are inherently short. It is more
sensible for assemblers to divide a plant into focused
factories within factories; more cost-effective to pay
motivated people and pay for more or less dedicated
machines- machines that are flexible enough to han-
dle design variations in one generation of compact
discs or VCRs and that can then be retooled or even
discarded when the new generation is bom.- In the
Wetzlar factory. Philips builds car radios with a mod-
ular assembly system in wbich each standard mod-
ule performs only a limited number of assembly
tasks. Resetting the system for a new generation of
radios has thus far proved a simple operation.
The key flexibility for assemblers in the longer run
is the setup time required to move from one genera-
tion of products to the next. When delivering prod-
ucts quickly and reacting to changing market
demands by shortening product eycles, economies of
scale are, of course, not worth pursuing. More impor-
tant efficiencies can be gained from reductions in
work-in-progress inventories, stoek inventories,
throughput time, and transportation costs.
These considerations make it more attractive than
ever to set up assembly factories close to end mar-
kets. They make the introduction of just-in-time op-
erations necessary. As a matter of fact, industrial
corporations add value (and realize high profit mar-
gins) less by refining the process of assembly than
2. For an advocacy of this viewpoint, sec Richard |. Schonberger, "Frugal
Manufacturing," HBR September-October 1987, p. 95.
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by marketing aggressively, distributing shrewdly, and
backing up their retail customers with fast delivery,
satisfactory service, and appealing design.
"here are exceptions, to be sure. Where the
market is stable (and competition from the
Japanese unlikely), a big manufacturer may
well justify a long-term investment in auto-
mation at assembly. GE's refrigerator market is a
case in point. Still, most hard-goods producers do
not have the luxury of planning this far ahead. For
most of us, the secret of assembly is flexibility, and
the secret of flexible assembly is the organization
of rather simple machines with people-those most
complex and flexible of beings. When you think
about it, Volvo's advances in the work team concept
may have done more to teach big manufacturers
about our "factories of the future" than GE's ad-
vances with automation.'
The Philips vacuum cleaner plant at Hoogeveen,
Holland recently went through a reorganization to
simplify product flow, make the managerial organi-
zation leaner and flatter, and institute fast iriforma-
tion feedback loops including specialists from
development, engineering, production, and market-
ing. Ideally, the management of assembly will be visi-
ble and vigorous. Reporting relationships will be
cooperative rather than authoritarian. Assembly sys-
tems will ensure rapid communications and feed-
back of information throughout the organization.
Simple, clear-cut, product-oriented organization will
break down harriers among design engineers, manu-
facturing executives, and marketing specialists. Flex-
ibility and bureaucracy do not mix.
None of this is to deny that robotics will likely ad-
vance us to the point where assemblers-those that
have perfected flow operations-can replace people.
Then, automation will mean even more consistent
quality at assembly and fewer interruptions on the
line; computer-driven refinements in measuring and
calibration are already reducing the time operators
need to stop the line to reset machines or log in qual-
ity control data. Nevertheless, important advances in
quality at assembly nowadays are coming not from
the architecture of chips so much as from the organi-
zation of people, from people-integrated manufactur-
ing, not from computer-integrated manufacturing.
Subassemblies, Components, Quality
The question of quality, of how major manufactur-
ers build it in at assembly, brings us to new and deci-
sive relations among the three tiers of production. It
also brings us to the heart of the matter. That a moti-
vated and well-organized work force is important for
assembling quality products is hardly arguable. The
most important advances in quality, however, are
coming not from anything assemblers do in their fac-
tories but from what subassemblers do in theirs.
During the past five years, hard-goods industries
have achieved a striking reduction in the number of
parts and subassemblies that have to be fit together
to make an end product. It is this reduction that,
more than anything else, accounts for increasing
product quality. Philips, the world's largest manufac-
turer of compact disc players, has reduced the num-
ber of subassemblies by 75% over the last five years.
The most prescient manufacturing corporations
have been working with OEM suppliers to design
subassemblies that are more manufacturable-that
include more functions but fewer components and
are designed to fit together in more predictable ways.
Fewer parts mean fewer opportunities for error.
Perhaps the best known of these product programs
is the IBM Proprinter, most of whose resilient molded
parts snap together and require perhaps one-third the
number of assembly operations as earlier model
printers. The Proprinter's subassemblies are so
manufacturable that robots can put them together,
while doing the job manually takes only about three
minutes. (Revealingly after building the units for
machine assembly, IBM transferred assembly opera-
tions from a robotized line in Charlotte, North Garo-
lina to direct-labor lines at its typewriter facility in
Lexington, Kentucky.)
Of course, getting the number of subassemblies
down has been a terribly expensive proposition. Early
on, IBM committed manufacturing engineers to de-
velop subassemblies for the Proprinter, including in-
vestments in robotized injection molding machines
and fused plastic/metal components. Subassembly
businesses generally soak up a comparatively higher
investment in automation and R&D than assembly
businesses. Philips invested more than $250 million
in a flat, square picture tube for a new generation of
color televisions (GTVs).
It should come as no surprise, then, that the logic
working on relations between assemblers and subas-
semblers works also on relations between compo-
nents producers and subassemblers-only more so.
Technology improvements and design innovations
that have increased the complexity of electrical prod-
ucts and vehicles have at the same time greatly re-
duced the complexity of assembling them from
components and subassemblies. New generations of
semiconductors, integrated plastic and metal parts,
3. We explore this development in "Toward the Factory of the Futtire,"
McKinsey Quarterly. Spiing 1986, p. 40.
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Design for Assembly
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We have studied 29 products including compact disc play-
ers, video cameras, telephones, and portable irons, from
1984 to 1986. In all, there have been striking reductions in
the number of components and assembly operations, and
corresponding reductions in cost.
ceramics, surface-mounted devices, switches-all
these have led to striking efficiencies.
Since 1984, Philips has reduced the numher of
parts in its compact disc player hy 75%. It has simpli-
fied VCRs hy a parts reduction of 55%, tuners hy
45%, and amplifiers hy 40%. And the trend has not
been restricted to the makers of audio/visual prod-
ucts. Swatch has reduced the numher of components
in its watches from 150 to 51. Less dramatically,
though more significantly perhaps. Ford has reduced
the numher of components in its average car from
30,000 to 22,000. Similar changes have heen made in
microwave ovens, personal computers, office copi-
ers, and air compressors.
'hese reductions have meant improved produc-
tivity rates at assembly. They have also meant,
clearly, decreased value-added from assemhly
operations as a whole. For end products, even
those that depend almost entirely on direct lahor to
fit their parts together, final assemhly constitutes
only a small part of the total lahor content. There has
heen a strong shift in the distrihution of value-added
toward the components stage. In 1969, assemhly of a
CTV took 12 V2 hours; today the process takes ap-
proximately 60 minutes, and the elapsed time will go
down considerably within the next few years.
At Philips, the cost structure of consumer elec-
tronic products-CDs, CTVs, PCs, or word pro-
cessors-typically consists of 70% material, 5% di-
rect lahor, and 25% other costs like indirect lahor,
huildings, and interest. Today there is more added
value in huilding the picture tuhe than in assemhling
the whole CTV A correspc.iding shift can he seen in
investment: in 1986, components amounted to 13%
of the $26 hillion turnover, hut 30% of all company
investment went to the components area. In the fu-
ture, components will take an even bigger slice of the
investment pie.
Incidentally, one can readily see why opportunities
for introducing advanced technology at the compo-
nents stage tends to he greater than at other stages.
As we said, flexihle manufacturing equipment that is
hig enough and smart enough to handle major
changes in assemhly routines is not likely to he cheap
and friendly enough. But equipment that allows
makers of smaller machined or molded components
to he truly flexihle are much cheaper, much
friendlier, and already up and running. Ramchandran
Jaikumar writes acutely that FMS technology allows
parts makers-the healthy ones-to produce virtu-
ally any component at very high quality and at a cost
equal to what used to be expected only from mass
production."
And so where factories producing suhassemhiies
are tending toward CAD/CAM and a high degree of
flexihle automation, the trend among component
factories is from high-precision mechanics to ultra-
high-precision mechanics, from micron technology
to suhmicron technology, from plastic or metal parts
to integrated plastic/metal parts. Tolerances in these
factories have hecome very exacting. Costs in R&D
are unprecedented.
Suppliers Get Bigger, Not Richer
Given the enormous R&LD investment required to
manufacture components competitively, it seems
ohvious that components makers would tend to get
higger and higger-that is, fewer and fewer-and
would have to enjoy relatively high profit margins.
Jaikumar argues that hecause of the new FMS tech-
nology, size is no longer a barrier to entry. But there
are other factors which put small components mak-
ers at a distinct disadvantage.
To understand these, it is useful to divide the com-
ponents industry into two areas: microelectronics
and mechanical parts. The microelectronics area
presents a clear case for higness. Philips' newest chip
factory in Nijmegen, Holland cost more than $250
4. Ramchandran Jaikumar, "Postindusirial Manufacturing," HBR
November-December 1986, p. 69.
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million. The turnover necessary to recover such an
investment profitably is correspondingly high. And
developing new components in this area may also
mean developing new materials and processes. Prod-
uct and process cannot be viewed separately; Philips
and Siemens together spent about $1 billion master-
ing submicron technology.
'he traditional Swiss watch industry was not
vertically integrated. It consisted of watchmak-
ers that designed and assembled the compo-
nents of a great many small independent
suppliers. When the Japanese watch industry gained
a large portion of the world watch market by supply-
ing quartz watches, the Swiss were taken aback. The
quartz technology was totally new to Swiss suppli-
ers, and many of thein could not and would not
adopt it. Swatch, the symbol of the Swiss recovery,
is the result of a concerted effort involving all steps
of the production chain from components to final
assembly.
But high-tech components are found in the me-
chanical area too, which is why German automaker
Daimler-Benz took over AEG (a $3.5 billion com-
pany). Daimler-Benz also absorbed Dornier ($750
million) for its know-how In lightweight carbon fi-
bers and synthetic alloys, and MTU ($ 1 billion) for its
research and manufacturing capacity in ceramics.
Large components suppliers, having wider technol-
ogy bases, are in a better position to introduce new
technology in any part of their businesses than are
small suppliers.
And so with respect to size, the picture is as one
would expect. Gomponents manufacturers-the
ones that have survived-have grown enormously
over the last ten years, a trend that is clear whether
one thinks of electronics components makers such
as Emerson Electric, or comparatively small automo-
tive components makers such as Simpson Industries.
With respect to the growth of margins, however, the
picture is surprisingly bleak. Profits are on the whole
much higher for the makers and sellers of end prod-
ucts than for the makers and sellers of components.
Big profits come from selling computers or automo-
biles, not from selling ehips or shafts.
The reasons for this pattem are all too clear. Mar-
gins on general-purpose components-switches,
wires, resistors, bolts-are lower than on customized
components. And for many of these low-tech compo-
nents, high-tech replacements witb improved price/
performance ratios often appear-all of which lead to
dumping and the further shrinking of margins. True,
the makers of standard components profit from
large-scale production. But most of the benefits of
scale are mitigated by brutal competition.
As for the costs of customized components, their
development can be amortized only over a long
time - at least three years in the auto industry. Yet the
success of the end product into which customized
components are designed is almost entirely out of the
components makers' hands. Philips or Ford will in-
troduce a range of products over the next five years;
consumers will not accept them all. But components
makers will have to bid to make the things that go
into them all and, in many cases, produce prototypes
along with their bids. These producers cannot expect
to recover their costs for all the components they
design - another reason, by the way, why the versatil-
ity that comes with bigness is an advantage.
None of this is to suggest that major manufactur-
ing designers aim to build end products mainly from
customized components. In fact, the opposite is true.
Our best design strategy is to build as mueh as possi-
ble from standard parts but to develop a proprietary
advantage in certain critical components-chips,
decks, printed circuits, and so forth. Of course this
strategy only adds to the components makers' diffi-
culties. It tends to eliminate customization, hence
opportunities to make high-margin items.
To be blunt, the typical big end-product manufac-
turer contributes a disproportionately small share of
the value-added, while the typical components man-
ufacturer reaps a disproportionately small share of
the profit. Heads, the major manufacturer wins; tails,
the components maker loses. All of which, obviously,
brings us back to the subject of vertical integration.
ince most of the teehnology content of end
products is in components, where earnings arc
shallow, major producers of technologically
sophisticated goods will have to compete more
aggressively for world leadership in component de-
velopment and production-something the [apanese
companies have been doing all along. Look at the
1986 ranking of the top integrated-circuit manufac-
turers by sales:
l.NEC
2. Hitachi
3. Toshiba
4. Motorola
5. Texas Instruments
6. Philips
7. Fujitsu
S.Matsushita
9. Mitsubishi
10. Intel
The producers of end products that need micro-
processors are slowly taking over this bushiess; the
list does not even include companies such as IBM
(the world's largest producer of chips) and Hewlett-
Packard, both of which make chips solely for their
own use.
True enough, big manufacturers may want to take
over certain components operations in any event, if
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only to make it easier to coordinate design functions.
Our point is that, regardless of design considerations,
the financial pressures will ultimately force them to
take over more components makers. Large, multi-
national electronics cumpanies like Philips are espe-
cially driven in this direction. Only within the inte-
grated company will there be an assured flow of ad-
vanced components to end product manufacturers
and a flow of capital back to components manufac-
turers. Only through vertical integration is the circle
firmly closed.
Manufacturers that do not invest in vertical inte-
gration may, for a while, enjoy some cash advantages.
Eventually, however, they will drive components pro-
ducers out of husiness or, more likely, find them-
selves huying components from their own
competitors. Philips took over Signetics in the 1970s
to avoid such competition. Recently, Philips huilt its
own factory for producing liquid crystal display
(LCD) screens.
So the question is one of husiness goals. If you in-
tend to maximize returns on investments, you may
well decide to sell off suppliers. If, however, you strive
for world market leadership, you will strive for verti-
cal integration.
Wili Competitors Be YourSuppiiers?
In fairness to Hayes and Abernathy, conditions in
electronics industries are somewhat different from
conditions in, say, the auto industry. Auto suppliers
may he so much a part of the family that major car
companies will unilaterally guarantee the flow of
capital back to high-quality suppliers either to keep
them solvent or to underwrite promising research
ventures. The makers of machine-vision quality con-
trol equipment springs to mind.
And yet automobile suppliers in Michigan, as ev-
erywhere else, are hardly thriving. The refrain one
hears again and again is that stockholders are losing
patience with razor-thin margins. If suppliers could
get together and huild their own car, it would he
another matter. But that, for components makers, is
always another matter.
Viewed in this light, the growing strength of Far
Eastern companies (especially Japanese) in the com-
ponents industry constitutes a definite threat for
Western high-volume manufacturers, in some areas.
Far Eastern companies already hold an almost mo-
nopolistic position. Even in the important area of
semiconductors, a traditional U.S. stronghold, we
have seen tbe Japanese making major inroads.
'he unahating pressure on prices will force an un-
ahating search for components with better price
performance ratios. Future developments in the
television industry, for example, will take place
in integrated circuits, surface mount devices, and pic-
ture tubes. A producer of television sets not suffi-
ciently involved in the research in these areas will he
in a very weak competitive position. (Philips is re-
searching new generations of high-definition CRT
tuhes, wide-screen tubes, new processing chips, pro-
jection TVs, and LCDs.) Many improvements in the
car industry will come out of electronics and new
materials like ceramics. But will Western industries
on the whole hecome dependent on integrated Japa-
nese companies for critical components?
All in all, tbe tendency of many Western compa-
nies toward less vertical integration seems increas-
ingly unrealistic. Flexibility downstream and in-
novation upstream are critical to manufacturing
renewal. And this means that hig companies will
bave to integrate their activities along the business
chain and carefully plan to transfer capital from one
link to another. Undoubtedly, manufacturers face a
new world. The solid corporation of the future will,
for new reasons, resemhle the solid corporations of
the past. ^
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